Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences (Chinese Version)
Keywords
semiconductor, supply chain, security risks, decoupling, enhancement strategies
Abstract
Against the backdrop of accelerating global digital transformation, intelligent upgrades, and intensifying geopolitical competition, the semiconductor supply chain has become the focal point of global technological, economic, and security dynamics. This study systematically examines the evolution of the global semiconductor supply chain, assesses security risks in China’s semiconductor industry, and analyzes the impact of China-US semiconductor decoupling using a hypothesis extraction approach. Based on these findings, it proposes strategic pathways to enhance China’s semiconductor competitiveness. Key findings include the following: (1) The global semiconductor supply chain exhibits both “regional concentration” and “industry fragmentation”. The US and Europe dominate upstream segments, Taiwan of China and the Republic of Korea maintain competitive advantages in midstream wafer fabrication, while China’s mainland achieves scale effects in downstream packaging and testing but remains constrained in high-end manufacturing and key technologies. (2) China has established a preliminary international supply capacity for mid- and low-end products in the field of semiconductor manufacturing materials; however, high-end raw materials remain heavily reliant on imports, with core technologies controlled by foreign entities. In the midstream segment of critical equipment, domestic substitution has made limited progress, and advanced manufacturing tools required for cutting-edge processes still depend on suppliers from the US, Japan, and the Netherlands, exposing China to significant risks of external technological blockade. In the downstream segment of semiconductor end products, China is deeply embedded in the global value chain, yet it still lacks systematic indigenous capabilities in high-end chip design and manufacturing. (3) China-US semiconductor decoupling will significantly impact China’s midstream and downstream sectors, particularly semiconductor manufacturing equipment and high-end products, where supply chain dependency remains high, posing a key bottleneck to industry self-sufficiency. Based on these conclusions, this study recommends that China (1) prioritizes supply chain self-sufficiency by systematically advancing domestic substitution of materials and equipment; (2) uses high-end chips as a breakthrough to move up the value chain; and (3) establishes a multi-tiered, globally integrated supply chain coordination mechanism to enhance regional technological and resource integration.
First page
2140
Last Page
2152
Language
Chinese
Publisher
Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences
Creative Commons License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
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Recommended Citation
ZHANG, Su; YANG, Ziyan; SUN, Yifan; XIA, Yan; and WANG, Huijuan
(2026)
"China’s semiconductor supply chain landscape and strategies for enhancing global competitiveness,"
Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences (Chinese Version): Vol. 41
:
Iss.
10
, Article 13.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3724/j.issn.1000-3045.20250324002
Available at:
https://bulletinofcas.researchcommons.org/journal/vol41/iss10/13
Included in
Electronic Devices and Semiconductor Manufacturing Commons, Science and Technology Policy Commons


