Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences (Chinese Version)


standard-essential patents (SEPs); FRAND; royalties; optimizing mechanism

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It is difficult for the owner and licensee of standard-essential patents (SEPs) to reach an ex-ante agreement on royalties by negotiation when "fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory" (FRAND) is a loose commitment. The dilemma of royalties of SEPs is a common hot issue for scholars and managers. This research indicates that it is the dual nature of shareability and private right, not publicly-owned and exclusive, which causes the dilemma of royalties of SEPs. Afterwards, this study compares five judicial methods, e.g. Hypothetical Negotiation, Patent Pool, Apportion Rule, Proportion Rule, and Analogy, and four mainstreams of economics, e.g. ex-ante Auction Model, ECPR & Shapley, Contribution Ratio & Top-Down, and Baseball-Style. The analysis shows that these economic methods provide some valuable explanations for judicial experiences and policies. Moreover, the key influential factors including technology, business, and legislation are developed.

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Bulletin of Chinese Academy of Sciences


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